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THE PRopf,R RoLE OF THE EXPERTMENTAL UsE DocrRrNE IN THE Pr.4rT ANALysrs:
How AND WHy rHE FEDERAL CrRCUrr's HoLDTNGIN HAMTLToN BEACH BRANDS, INC. y.
SUNBEAM PRoDUCTS, INC. SHoULD BE CoRRECTED
INTRODUCTION
The court in Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc. held that an order
form for manufacture ofan invention by a supplier constituted a commercial offer for sale,
thereby triggering an on-sale bar to patentability under 35 U.S.C. $,l02(b).1 The holding deals a
significant blow to the experimental use exception to the statutory bar established by the
Supreme Court.2 Small businesses and independent inventors, who often lack in-house
manufacturing and must therefore contract with third parties to produce prototypes, will need to
be especially wary oftriggering the on-sale bar before their patent applications are filed.
The decision in Hamilton Beach conflicts with existing case law, and will have
significant economic and legal implications on many companies. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit's decision in Hamilton Beach Brands. Inc. v. Sunbeam Products..Inc. should be
reconsidered, and Congress should address the inconsistencies present in Pfaff analyses.3 More
specifically, Congress should reformulate the term "commercial" in the context ofthe on-sale bar
to explicitly require consideration of whether the commercial aspects ofthe sale were incidental
to a primary purpose of experimentation. Additionally, the term "experimental" should be
formally defined to provide a clear articulation of the test for determining whether an activity is
experimental. Accordingly, this note will provide a proposed five factor test for determinin"
whether an activity is experimental in nature.
I Hamilton Beach Brands, [nc. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc., 2012 WL 6562220 at + I (E.D. Va. Aug. 13,2OlZ), qffd,
2012-1581,2013 WL 408t872 (Fed. Cir. August 14,2013).
2 See Pfaffv. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55,64 (1998).
1 Id. at 68-69.
This note will explore the $102(b) on-sale bar of the Patent Act.a fn" put".rt Act, grants
inventors limited periods of time during which they are granted exclusive rights to make and use
their inventions.5 These periods are statutorily determined based on the filing date of the patent
application and the type ofpatent granted.6 To prevent inventors from reaping the benefits of
their inventions for indeterminate periods of time prior to filing a patent, $102(b) presents a bar
to patentability that forces inventors to either file a patent application or waive their rights to a
patent within one year ofcertain qualifying public activities.T One such activity is placing the
invention "on-sale" in the United States.8
This note will also discuss the policy concems underlying the on-sale statutory bar. The
Constitution promotes advancement ofsciences and the arts by securing limited rights to
inventors.e That provision was included in the Constitution because its drafters believed that the
providing inventors and artists a personal stake in developing new inventions and art best serves
the pubtic interest.l0 Courts and Congress have struggled to strike a balance between the benefit
to the public through competition and the individual rights of particular inventors.rl To this end,
courts have articulated several considerations that must be weighed against each other when
formulating rulings on unclear areas of patent law.l2 These considerations have, among other
things, justified the use ofan exception to the on-sale statutory bar when an inventor seeks to
4 35 U.S.C. $102(b) (amended 201 l).
5 35 U.S.C. $ l5a(ax2).6See35 U.S.C. $ l5 (a)(2); 35 U.S.C. S173.
? 35 U.S.C. $102(b) (amended 201 l).8ld.
e U.S. Const. Art. I, $ 8, cl. 8.
ro See "Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson." The University ofChicago. The Founders' Constitution, Vol. l, Ch.
16, Doc.25. Edited by Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh. Available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v I ch I 6s25.html. Accessed 9/20120 I 3 -
tt See, e.g., Bonito Boats, tnc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, tnc.,489 U.S. l4l, 146 (1989) ("From their inception, the
federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition
that imiiation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itselfand the very lifeblood ofa
competitive economy.") (citations omitted).
t2 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. U. S.,654 F.2d 55,61 (Ct. Cl. l98l).
perfect his invention, since the public ultimately derives more benefit from completed inventions
than from inventions that do not function properly.l3
This note will argue that the Federal Circuit should reconsider Hamilton Beach and
clarify current case law in a manner that brings it in line with procedural and substantive aspects
of the experimental use doctrine as previously applied by the Circuit. Procedurally, prior case
law suggests that the experimental use doctrine is not an affirmative defense.la Rather, courts
should consider whether or not the primary purpose of a sale is to yield a commercial gain or to
conduct experimental testing, regardless of the explicit arguments raised by the parties. The
Hamilton Beach court, by contrast, specifically ignored the on-sale doctrine because Hamilton
Beach had not explicitly raised this argument.rs Substantively, the facts presented in the case
suggested that Hamilton Beach had not made the invention patentable or commercially
exploitable at the time ofsale, yet the court held that the offer for sale was nonetheless
invalidating.r6
The holding in Hamilton Beachhas implications on future decisions regarding the on-sale
bar that impede the policy goals embodied in $102.'i It discourages inventors from interacting
with suppliers when attempting to obtain prototypes or pre-mass production samples.l8 This will
impede progress by stalling the process used to perfect inventions, as inventors withhold the
results oftheir experimentation untiI further into the development process.le Further, the decision
13 City ofElizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co.,97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877).
ra Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 135 l, l36l (Fed. Cir.2002). See also Allen Engineering Corp. y. Bartell
lndustries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336,1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
t5 Hamilton Beach,20l3 WL 4081872 at *7 (Reyna, dissenting).
t7 see generally Hamilton Beach Brqnds, Inc. v. sunbeam Products, Inc.,TheCislo & Thomas LLp Blog (Nov. 12,
20 l3), http://cisloandthomas.com/hamilton-beach-brands-inc-v-sunbeam-products-inc/.
tB ld.
te see generally Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 u. s. I , 2 ( I 829) (suggesting that, when inventors withhold their
inventions, the policy goals underlying $ 102 are obstructed).
\may have immediate practical implications, particularly on smaller companies and independent
inventors. Such entities often lack the resources for mass-producing samples and prototypes in-
house.2o As a result, these entities often need to contract with third parties to obtain prototypes of
their inventions for testing.2l Due to the holding in HamiltonBeach, an undetermined number of
existing patents may face invalidation based on such prototyping actiyity.22 Such invalidation
may have drastic consequences on smaller ftrms, which have proven instrumental in developing
inventions in emerging fields of technology.23
In Part I, this note will provide an overview of the existing law related to $102(b),
particularly with respect to the on-sale bar to patentability that triggers based on activities
occurring more than one year prior to filing. To this end, this note will discuss the policy goals
justifting for the on-sale bar, as well as the facts and holding of Hamilton Beach.In Part II, this
note will argue that Hamilton Beach was decided incorrectly by examining the holding's
inconsistency with established legal principles and policy goals, as well as the adverse practical
effects on inventors. In Part IlI, this note will analyze the potential solutions to the problems
presented by the holding in Hamilton Beach and the consequences of those solutions, as well as
propose a course of action that Congress could take in clarifying existing case law.
PART I. BACKGROUND/OVERVIEW
The on-sale bar to patentability is codified in $102(b) of the United States Code.24 This
note will first provide a brief introduction to the pertinent statutory language of $102.
20 See, e.g., Duane Benso n, The Top Five Mistakes in Preppingfor Outsourced Prototypes, Embedded Computing
Design (Aug. 2, 2012). Available at http://embedded-computing.com/white-papers/the-five-mistakes-prepping-
outsourced-prototypes/.
2t See, e.g., id.
22 See Hamilton Beach,726F.3dat 1381 (Reyna, dissenting).
23 See id.
24 35 U.S.C. $102(b) (amended 201l).
\
A. Statutory n""kg.orrra
Under 35 U.S.C. $ 102, an inventor must present a novel invention to obtain a patent.25
Additionally, $102(b) presents a statutory bar to applicants seeking to file a patent on an
invention that had been disclosed to the public more than one year prior to that patent's filing
date.26 Means of making an invention available to the public include using the invention in
public, publishing information about the invention, patenting the invention, and offering a
completed version ofthe invention for sale in this country.27
Courts had previously interpreted the on-sale provision ofthe bar by applying a "totality
of the circumstances" test, suggesting that factors such as "the level ofskill and state ofthe art,"
as well as "the nature ofthe invention" must be considered in tandem to determine whether the
on-sale statutory bar applies to any given scenario.28 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit previously
noted that, in determining whether a sale was sufficiently complete as to induce application of
the on-sale bar, "[a]ll of the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell, including the
stage ofdevelopment ofthe invention and the nature ofthe invention, must be considered and
weighed."2e In an effort to maintain flexibility so that the $102(b) bar could be applied
appropriately to a wide variety of factual situations, the Federal Circuit specifically elected to
avoid formulating rigid standards for applying such factors to lactual scenarios.s0 This lack of
rigidity led to unpredictability, as courts would apply different lactors to different cases.il
']s 35 U.S.C. gl02 (amended 201 l).
2u 35 U.S.C. gl02(b) (amended 201 l).
2'ld.
28 Micro chemicar. Inc. v. Great prains chemicar co., Inc., 103 F.3d 1538, r553 (Fed. cir. 1997). see arsoEnvirotech corp. v. westech Engineering Inc. 90 4 F.2d 157 r, 1574 (Fed. cir. re'eo) lcrting (irg irrt i-"r, co.pv. Otari Corp.. 761 F.2d853.860 (Fed. Cir. ts85l).
':o UMC Elecs Co. v. Unired Srares. 816 F.2d64:/.656 (Fed. Cir. I987).
'u W. Marine Elecrronics, Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., Ltd.,764 F.2d g4},'g44 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
't Id. at 844-845.
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the "totality ofthe circumstances test" in order to
adopt a more definite test for the on-sale bar in Pfaff v. lhells Electronics, Inc.32 In Pfaff, the
Supreme Court clarified that, in the context ofthe Patent Act, the word "invention" generally
refers to the inventor's conception of the idea behind the invention rather than the creation ofa
physical embodiment of that idea.33 Accordingly, the new test locused on two conditions for
application ofthe on-sale bar: the purported sale must be commercial in nature, and the invention
must be ready for patenting at the time of sale.sa
Notably, the Supreme Court did not simply adopt conception as the standard for
determining whether the invention was "ready for patenting" at the time of the offer.35 Instead,
an invention is "ready for patenting" when it has been reduced to practice or sufficiently
described in a written document such that a person of reasonable skill in the art could practice
the invention without undue experimentation.s6 The Court stated that an inventor has reduced the
invention to practice when that inventor possesses an embodiment that meets all of the claim
limitations and works lor its intended purpose.3T The Court also noted that an invention works
for its intended purpose when "there is a demonstration ofthe workability or utility ofthe
claimed invention."38 since Pfffi other cotrts have also clarified that an actual sale need not
occur to trigger $102(b) if an offer to sell alone meets the two prongs of the Pfalf test'3e
32 Pfqlf,525 U.S. at 68-69.
13 ld. at 55.
"-i;.;rae (noting that the 
,.totality ofthe circumstances" test has been criticized for being unnecessarily vague)'
See a/so Brasselerl U.S.A. t, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp', 182 F 3d 888' 890 (Fed Cir' 1999)'
15 See Lindholm, infra note 174. ar256'
1" Pfaff.525 U.S. at 67-68.
'- 
rii"n n. Evans.204 F 3d 1094. 1097 (Fed Cir' 2000)'
38 Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1563 (Fed Cir' 1996) --,-
re Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett t prun, rn"., 5 l6 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir' 2008) ("Neither profit' revenue'
#;;;;;;;;;;i rur" t. ,"quirJJ fo. g," use to be a "om.ercial offer under [35 U S C ] section 
102(b) ")
Courts have noted that the parties to a sale or offer for sale must be separate entities for a
sale or offer between those parties to qualify as a statutory bar to patentability.ao Even if
commercial sales occur in secret and the information is not publicly accessible, the activity may
still constitute a sale under Sl02(b).41 Particularly, courts have suggested that activities may
qualifu for the on-sale bar when the inventor commercially exploits his invention prior to filing a
patent, regardless of whether the pubtic actually becomes aware ofthe invention.a2
Significantty, courts have noted that there is no "supplier exception" to the "on-sale"
statutory bar.al Thus, a court may properly find a patent invalid due to a commercial contract
wherein a supplier offered to make and sell an invention to the inventor.44 However, commercial
contracts made by suppliers do not necessarily constitute commercial offers for sale pursuant to
Pfalf.as Specifically, the on-sale bar is not triggered when an inventor "takes a design to a
fabricator and pays the fabricator for its services in fabricating afew sample products."a6
Potentially invalidating activity does not always present a bar to patentability.aT Activity
that would otherwise trigger the on-sale bar is exempt if it is experimental in nature.a8 In
assessing experimentation, courts have considered various factors, including documentation of
testing (or lack thereof), nature of the invention, and whether the inventor retained control over
a0 [n re Caveney, 761 F.2d671,676 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See ( soFerag AC v. Quipp, Inc.,45 F.3d 1562, 1567 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) ("Where the parties to the alleged sale are related, whether there is a statutory bar depends on whether the
seller so controls the purchaser that the invention remains out ofthe public's hands.") (alteration to original).
arWoodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
a2 Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cit. 1946).
a3 Special Devices, [nc. v. OEA, Inc.,270 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir.2001).
aa See id.at 1357 (holding that an offer by a supplier to manufacture an invention and provide it to the seller for the
express purpose ofcommercial stockpiling raised a $ 102(b) bar to patentability).
a5 Brasseler- I 82 F.3d at 891 .
a6 1d (emphasis added).
11 Id.
a8 Baxter [ntem., Inc. v. coBE Laboratories, Inc., 88 F. 3d 1054, 1059 (Fed. cir. 1996) (citing Tp Labs, Inc. v.Proll Positioners, lnc.,724 F.2d965,971 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson pavement
Co., 97 U.S. 126,134 (1877).
the invention after relinquishing physicat possession.ae The Federal Circuit has stated that "this
list is not exhaustive, and all of the experimentation factors may not apply in a particular case."so
Procedurally, courts have clarified that the experimental use doctrine is a "negation," noting that
the burden ofpersuasion with respect to experimental use never shifts to the patentee.sl
Even activity that generates public awareness of the invention may qualify for the
experimental use exception depending on the circumstances surrounding that activity.s2
However, testing that relates solely to unclaimed leatures does not qualify as experimental use.53
Further, for a patentee to succeed in claiming that a sale was primarily experimental in nature,
courts have held that an inventor must retain some degree ofcontrol over the invention.5a Case
law suggests that experimental use "includes 'tests needed to convince [the inventor] that the
invention is capable ol performing its intended use in its intended environment. "'55
For example, in Kolmes v. LVorld Fibers Corp., World Fibers Corporation attacked the
validity ofKolmes' patent on durable gloves because samples ofthe gloves were distributed and
sold prior to one yeiu before Kolmes applied for a patent.56 The Federal circuit found that the
gloves were not suitable for their intended use at the time ofdistribution and that Kolmes had no
basis for determining the durability of the gloves without testing.sT As a result, the Federal
4e EZ Dock v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
50 Electromotive Div. ofcen. Motors corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. ofCen. Elec. co., 417 F.3d 1203, l2 t3 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citing In re Brigance,792 F.2d 1103, I108 (Fed. Cir. 1986))
st See TP Labs. '724 F .2d at 97 l.
52 Bqxter lntern.88 F.3d 1054 at 1059 ("Experimental use negates public use; when proved, it may show that
particular acts, even ifapparently public in a colloquial sense, do not constitute a public use within the meaning of
iection 102.") (citing TP Labs, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, 1nc.,724 F.2d 965,971 (Fed. Cir. 1984)'
5r In re Brigance, 792 F.2d | 103, 1 109 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
5a See In re Smith, 714F.2d ll27,l137 (Fed. Cir. 1983); TP Labs,724F.2d at 912; Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo
Vann, Inc.,828 F.2d I558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
55 EZ Doci,276 F.3d ar 1352 (alteration in original) (quoting Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d571.583 (Ct of
cr. le78)).
56 Kolmes v. World Fibers Corp., 107 F 3d 1534, 1539 (Fed Cir' 1997)'
57 Id. at 1540.
Circuit held that the experimental use negation applied, thereby nullifying the invalidation ofthe
patent based on the sale of sample gloves.s8
On September 16,2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
("ata'1.'o The most significant change introduced by this act is the conversion from a "first-to-
invent" system to a "first-to-fi1e" system, which affects all patent applications filed after March
13, 2013.60 Under the previous "first-to-fi1e" system, an inventor applying for a patent can
bypass a patent examiner's rejection based on prior art by ctaiming that he or she made the
invention before the reference cited in that rejection.6r Under the new "first to file" system, the
ability to assert prior invention is only available to patent applicants in limited circumstances.62
As a result, the American patent system now generally rewards those inventors who avail
themselves of the patent office first regardless ofdate ofinvention.63
In addition to the general system change present in the AIA, the revised version of $ 102
also modifies the context ofthe on-sale statutory bar.6a At first blush, this new wording may not
appear to have a significant impact on the on-sale bar. However, as advised by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the revised version ofthe section places a much greater
emphasis on determining whether the allegedly invalidating disclosure was available to the
58 ld.
5e LEAHY SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT, pL tt2-29. September t6,201t, t25 Stat 284.
60 Id.
6r See 37 C.F.R. $ I .l3l (for pre-Ame ca Invents Act applications, an applicant may "swear behind" prior art by
providing an affidavit stating that he or she had conceived ofthe invention and reduced it to practice prior to the date
the prior art became public).
62 Such circumstances include situations where an inventor made and disclosed the invention up to one year before
the prior art asserted by the USPTO became available to the public. LEAHY SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT.
PL I 12-29, September 16,2011, 125 Star 284.
63 ld.
64 35 U.S.C. $ 102 (201 I ) (noting that any "disclosue made I year or less before the effective filing date ofa
claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(l) if the discLsure was made
by the inventor . . . or the subject maner disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the
inventor . . .").
public.6s Assuming courts interpret the revised provision consistently with the USPTO's
recommendations, such courts will construe the on-sale bar to only include offers for sale that
were available to the general public at the time of offer. Consequently, the ruling in Hamilton
Beach may prove moot with respect to patents filed after the first-to-file provision of the AIA
went into effect.66
Regardless of whether courts adopt the USPTO's recommendations with respect to post-
AIA patents, patent applications subject to pre-AIA law will be restricted by judicial
interpretations of that law, rather than those interpretations of the post-AIA law.67 Patent
applications filed prior to March 16,2013, are all subject to pre-AIA law until their terms
expire.68 As a result, any decision that interprets pre-AIA law will affect issued patents for over
two decades into the future.6e
This note will next examine the policy justifications for $ 102(b).
B. Policy Rationale Behind $102(b)
American patent law is rooted in the Constitution's "Patent and Copyright" clause, which
grants Congress the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."T0 In explaining this clause, courts have suggested that providing a personal
incentive for individuals is "the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
65 78 Fed. Reg. I1059, 11075 (Feb. l4,2}l3) ("The phrase'on sale' in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(l) is treated as having
the same 11"uning as 'on sale' in pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. S 102(b), except that the sale must make the invention ovailable
to the public.") (emphasis added).
66 LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT, PL ll2-29, September 16,201l, 125 Stat 28a $ 3(n) (Noting that
the first-to-file provision, among others, will be effective l8 months after Congress passes the legislation, and that
any patents including claims or references dated before then would be subject to the new provisions.).
67 Id.
68 Id.
6e 35 U.S.C. $ 154 (noting that a patent "grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues
and ending 20 years frornthe date on which the application for the patent was filed . ' '")'
70 U.S. Const. Art. I, $ 8, cl. 8.
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and inventors in 'science and useful Arts."'71 The goals ofpatent law expressed in the
Constitution have been embodied in the Patent Act of 1952 and in the creation of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO").72 Now, the USPTO exercises its authority to
review and grant patents to inventors.T3 Further, the Patent Act endows patents granted by the
USPTO with a presumption of validity.Tl
Courts have expressly considered four primary policy goals in the context ofthe on-sale
bar.75 First, the on-sale bar serves as a mears of encouraging widespread disclosure ofnew
inventions to the public as soon as possible.T6 Second, the on-sale bar prevents inventors from
commercially exploiting their inventions for periods that are substantially longer than the
statutorily-authorized terms.?7 Third, the on-sale bar discourages removal of inventions from the
public domain after "the public justifiably comes to believe [the inventions] are freely
available."i8 Finally, the on-sale bar affords the inventor a reasonable period of time after sales
activity to determine whether a patent is worth pursuing.Te
Pursuant to these goals, courts have expressed a need for reasonable certainty in the
context of $ 102(b), arguing that uncertainty effectively deprives inventors of valuable rights.Eo
Additionally, courts have clarified that the purpose of encouraging widespread public disclosure
is severely hampered by forcing inventors to file incomplete inventions and to sacrifice valuable
7t See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954).
72 See 35 U.S.C. $$ l-376 (2000) Getaining the primary purposes set forth in the former version ofthe act by
establishing requirements lor obtaining patents, providing remedies for patent infringement, and setting fonh a
framework for the American system ofpatent law).
13 Id.
74 35 U.S.C. $ 282 (1994).
75 See, e.g., IJMC Elecs. Co.,816 F.2d at 652 (Nies, J.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.74S (1988) (quoting General Elec.
Co. v. United States,654 F.2d 55, 6l (Ct. Cl. l98l ) (en banc); Ervirotech,g04 F.2d at 1574 (listing the four
purposes in the on sale context)).
16 W. Marine Electronics.T64 F.2d at845.
'7 Id.
78 S. Rep. No. 76-876, at l-2 (1939); H.R. Rep. No. '16-96l, at I -2 ( I939) (alteration to original).
1e W. Mqrine Electronics,T64 F.2d at 845.
80 Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.5.267,274 (1887).
L1,
time developing changes that would improve those inventions.8l Moreover, rather than serving
the public by providing greater access to useful knowledge, inadequate filings simply add to the
growing number of papers processed by the USPTO and by courts.82
As far back as I 8l 3, cou(s began to recognize that there should be an allowance for
inventors to make bona fide efforts to perfect their inventions without being subjected to
shortened patent terms.83 Indeed, in City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., the
court discussed the value that a properly functioning invention presents for the public.8a As a
result, the Supreme Court formulated an experimental use negation ofthe on-sale bar.85 Courts
have since suggested that such a negation protects an "interest in providing inventors with a
definite standard for determining when a patent application must be filed," and that "a rule that
makes the timeliness ofan application depend on the date when the invention is 'substantially
complete' seriously undermines the interest in certainty."86
This note will now provide the lactual and procedural history of its principal case,
Hamilton Beach Brands Inc. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc. , as well as the judicial reasoning from
the Hamilton Beach cottt's majority and dissenting opinions.
C. Case Summary
The decision in Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. Sunbeam Products,lnc. involved cross
motions for summary judgment based on allegations that claims of a patent were invalid due to
being anticipated by prior art.87 The Plaintiff, Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. ("Hamilton Beach")
8t (lMC Elecs. Co.,816F.2dar660 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
82 Id. at 665 (Smith, J., dissenting).
83 Whittemore v. Cutter,29 F. Cas. I120, I l2l (1813).
sa City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 ( I 877) C'Ult is the interest ofthe public,
ut *Jll ur lthe inventor], that the invention should be perfect and properly tested, before a patent is granted for it.").
85 Id. at 136.
86 Pfqf,525 U.S. at 65-66.
t, tiamilton Beach Brands. Inc. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc.,20l2 WL 6562220 at*l (E.D. Va. Aug. 13,2012\, afd.
2012-158t,2013 WL 4081872 (Fed. Cir. August 14,2013).
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claimed that Sunbeam Products, Inc.'s ("Sunbeam") slow cooker device infringed one of
Hamilton Beach's patents.88 Sunbeam also argued that Hamilton Beach's patent was invalid
under several grounds, including the on-sale bar to patentability pursuant to $102(b).8e
Ultimately, the trial court found for Sunbeam, holding that Sunbeam's product did not
infringe Hamilton Beach's patent.e0 The court also lound that Hamilton Beach's patent was
invalid under the on-sale bar, holding that a commercial offer to sell the slow cooker had
occu.rred more than one year before Hamilton Beach filed its patent application.er Emphasizing
the significance ofthe binding nature of a contract when determining whether presentation ofthe
contract constitutes an offer for sale, the court held that the contract formed with Hamilton
Beach's manufacturer was sufficient to trigger the on-sale bar.e2 Notabty, the court cited
precedent to deny the argument that a so-called "supplier exception" to the on-sale bar exists.e3
Although the offer for sale came from a foreign entity, the court specified that the invention was
"on-sale" in this country, since the offer was directed to a company in the U.S.ea
With respect to patentability of the invention at the time of the alleged offer, the
Hamilton Beach court held that the slow cooker was "ready for patenting" prior to presentation
of the contract.e5 Specifically, the court suggested that the computer automated drawings and
specifications that Hamilton Beach had presented to potential investors before submitting the
purchase order to its supplier were sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that a suitable invention
88 Id.
8e ld.
x Id. at *5-
et Id. zt * 18.
e2 ld. at *17.
e3 Homilton Beach,2012 wL 6562220 at *4 (citing Special Devices, Inc. v. oEA, Inc., 270 F .3d 1353,1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
e4 Id.
es Id. at * 18.
13
could have been manufactured prior to the date of the alleged offer.e6 As a result, the subsequent
sale was deemed sufficient grounds for invalidation of the Hamilton Beach patent pursuant to the
on-sale bar to patentability.eT
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's holding in a split
decision.e8 The Federal Circuit's reasoning differed slightly from that of the District Court.ee
While the District Court said that an on-sale bar only triggered because a binding contract had
been formed with Hamilton Beach's manufacturer, the Federal Circuit noted that an offer that
could lead to a binding contract with simple acceptance would suffice, and that the binding
contract itselfneed not exist at the time the purported offer was made.r00 The Federal Circuit
further confirmed that the invention was ready for patenting as ofthe date of the offer despite
Hamilton Beach's claim that the cooker had not yet been perfected.l0r Specifically, the court
asserted that the existence of a functional yet imperfect prototype indicated that the cooker was
sufficiently ready for patenting at the time of sale.l02
In his dissent, Judge Reyna argued that applying the "no-supplier-exception" rule in such
an overly broad manner would "all but abolish this distinction [between experimental use and
public or commercial use] and render the experimental-use exception useless for a significant
class of innovators."ro3 Judge Reyna suggested that the majority's decision ignored the
possibility that the use was experimental in nature, particularly pointing out a flaw in the slow
e6 Id.
e1 Id. at +19-20.
e8 Hamilton Beach Brands. lnc. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc. 2012-1581,2013 WL 4081872 at * | (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14,
2013).
ee ld. at*6.
too Hamilton Beqch.2}l2 WL 6562220 at*17; Hamilton Beach,20l3 WL 4081872 at *6'
tot Hamilton Beqch, 2013 WL 4081872 at *7.
to2 !d. (cilirlg weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d '1326, 133234 (Fed' Cir' 1998))'
ror 1d at +9 (Reyna, dissenting) (alteration to original)
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cooker that resulted in leaking as a fact suggesting a need for further refinement.l04 Judge Reyna
also stated that his primary concern regarding the outcome of the case was the potential impact
the result could have on smaller entities and individual inventors, who often cannot produce
early versions oftheir products without using an extemal supplier.l05
Next, this further argues that the decision in Hamilton Beach was incorrectly decided,
both with respect to the relevant case law and to the outcome's stifling effect on inr"n,ion.
PART II. THE DECISION IN HAMILTON BEACH WAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED
The hotding in Homilton Beach presents significant problems that may have far reaching
implications on American patents and inventors. The case demonstrates inconsistencies when
compared to established law and guidance regarding the on-sale bar. In addition, the holding may
have severe implications on patent law and inventors, since the holding tends to discourage
inventors from fully developing their inventions, in stark contrast to the policy goalsjustifying
the patent system.106 Finally, the holding sets a legal precedent that may have adverse economic
and legal implications, padcularly on smaller companies and individuat inventors.r0T
A. Inconsistency with Established Legal Principles
Although the Hamilton Beach court determined that the sale was commercial in nature
and that the offer raised a $102(b) issue, that court nevertheless could have found the patent valid
by concluding that the sale was part ofan experimental effort to perfect the invention under
r04 /d at * lo (Reyna, dissenting) ("At the very least, the majority should have identified how the purchase order was
commercial in nature when the manufacturing resulted in slow cookers that were incapable of ,i;ibit[ing] leakage
ofthe food stuffs from the interior ofthe container."') (alteration in original).
105 Hamilton Beach,20l3 WL 4081872 at *10 (Re),na, dissenting).
\06 see generally Hamilton Beqch Brands, lnc. v. sunbeam prodicx, tnc.,'fhe Cislo & Thomas LLp BIog (Nov. 12,
2-013), http://cisloandthomas.com,tamilton-beach-brands-inc-v-sunbeam_products_inc,/.
tol Hqmilton Beqch.20l3 WL 4081872 at *10 (Re),na, dissenting).
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either prong of the Pfaff test.r08 Under the first prong, a sale that is conducted primarily for
experimental purposes does not trigger the on-sale bar.loe Under the second prong, patentable
subject matter that is not yet capable of performing its intended function at the time ofthe initial
offer for sale does not constitute the invention for purposes of the on-sale bar.l l0
Courts have suggested that, in some circumstances, limited commercial exploitation of an
invention will not raise the statutory bar so long as the commercial profits from that sale are
incidental to the primary goal of perfecting the invention.lrr For example, in Speedrack, Inc. v.
Interlake, Inc.,lnlerlake asserted that Speedrack's patent on an adjustable storage rack was
invalid due to a commercial sale ofan end frame ofa rack that occurred more than a year before
the application for patent.r12 The Speedrack court held that ajury could have found that the
commercial nature ofthe sale was merely incidental to the purpose of experimentation.l 13 The
court noted that Speedrack had offered the end frame at a "special reduced price."rla
Additionally, the court held that informal feedback from the storeowner who received the frame
was sufficient to gauge performance for this relatively simple invention.lls
In Hamilton Beach,the sale was specifically conducted in a manner that allowed the
inventor to remain in possession and control of the slow cookers in question after completion of
the transaction.l16 None ofthe facts alleged by Sunbeam suggested that Hamilton Beach had
r08 Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing EZ Dock,276 F.3d at
1352) ("This court notes that in applying the Pfdf two-part test in the context ofa public use bar, evidence of
experimental use may negate either the 'ready for patenting' or 'public use' prong.").
'oe Pfaff, 525 u.s. at 68-69.tyr ld.
Irr Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S.249,256 (1887).
r12 Speedrack, Inc. v. Interlake, Inc., 1987 WL 9301 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 1987). Contra In re Snith' 714 F '2d at
I l3j (holding that a consumer test ofthe product was not necessary for purposes ofscientific experiments and,
therefore, thit the test had the pdmary purpose ofdetermining commercial marketability ofthe invention).
tt3 ld.
tt4 ld. at *4.
tt5 Id.
116 Hqmilton Beqch.20l3 WL 4081872 at *5.
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plans to proceed to resell the cookers it had ordered.rlT Rather, the fact that Hamilton Beach was
facing issues with leaking cookers demonstrates that Hamilton Beach would need to further
rehne the cookers before those devices would be suitable for their intended use.l18 Further, the
majority implies that the number ofcookers ordered is relevant to the determination of
experimental use.lle As the dissent notes, however, the number of units ordered is no longer a
relevant consideration for determining whether use is experimental in nature.l20
In contrast to the majority's consideration oforder size in assessing the nature ofthe sale,
courts have articulated several other factors for facilitating analysis ofthe first prong of the Pfaff
test based on principles ofcontract law.12l Such factors include the amount ofcontrol retained by
the inventor after the sale, whether records of experimentation were kept, and what degree of
commercial exploitation was performed during testing.r22 Notably, those factors do not include
the number of units purportedly sold. Further, as noted by Hamilton Beach, regardless ofthe size
of its order, the order itself "was not the result of customer demand or projections."l2l
The Hamilton Beach majority asserted that the experimental use negation was not argued
by Hamilton Beach's counsel and, therefore. that the exception was not at issue in that case.l2a
tt1 Id. at n.3 (Reyna, dissenting).
' '8 /d at * l0 (Reyna, dissenting) ("[A]t the time the order was placed, Hamilton Beach was repeatedly changing the
product specification due to a series ofdesign failures, most notably, foodstuffs leaking through the lid. The design
remained unstable for nearly three months affer the purchase order was placed.").
rre Id at n.2 ("The dissent does not dispute that a firm offer for sale occurred in this case or that the offer for sale
was for almost 2000 units ofthe Stay or Go @ slow cooker.").
120 Id. al n-3 (Reyna, dissenting) ("This sort ofquantitative analysis [number ofcookers ordered] was previously
accepted under the 'totality ofthe circumstances' test-a test rejected by the Supreme couft in Pfafr ") (alteruIion to
original).
tzt EZ Dock,276 F.3d at 1357 (stating l3 factors relevant to the first part of the Pfafftest). See olso In re Smith,714
F.2d at I l3 6 (necessiry for public testin g); C ity of Elizabet ., 97 U. S. at t 35 (extent of public testing in relalion to
the nature of the invention; Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 7 40 F .2d 1529, 1535 (Fed. C ir. I 984) (length of the test
period, whether payment was made, whether there was a secrecy obligation, whether progress records were kept,
and who conducted the experiments); and D. L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d I 144, I l5 I (Fed. Cir.
1983) (degee ofcommercial exploitation during testing).
122 ld.
t23 Hamilton Beach.20l3 WL 4OBI872 at n.3 (Reyna, dissenting).
124 Id. at n-2.
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Thus, the majority claimed, the doctrine would not be affected by the outcome of Hamilton
Beach.t2s However, as the dissent correctly noted, even though Hamilton Beach had not
explicitly argued that the experimental use exception applied, Hamilton Beach had alleged that
its product was not complete or prepared for commercial sale at the time of the offer and,
therefore. that the sale was not commercial in nature.l26
Like Judge Reyna in Hamilton Beach, the cor*t in Madey v. Duke University noted that
the "experimental use doctrine" does not need to be affirmatively asserted by a patent owner to
be applied.f2T The Madey court noted that a court should apply the doctrine regardless of whether
it was asserted by the parties so long as the facts on record indicate an experimental purpose.l28
Accordingly, the experimental use doctrine should have been considered in this case
regardless of whether Hamilton Beach specifically raised it. More importantly, the court did not
apply a key legal principle that had been applied in prior analogous cases.l2e This type oferror
could be repeated by future cou(s looking to the Hamilton Beach holding for guidance on
factually similar situations. Therefore, the result of this case may impact future applications of
the experimental use negation.
The fotlowing section discusses the effects ofthe case on the policy issues that Congless
sought to address via $ I 02.
B. Inconsistency with Policy Goals
125 ld.
126 Id at * l0 (Reyna, dissenting) (noting that Hamilton Beach raised the issue of leaking cookers to the court).
12? Madey v. Duke University,30T F.3d 1351, l36l (Fed. Cir.2002) ("Madey argues that the experimental use
defense is an affirmative defense that Duke must pelad or lose. We disagree. Madey points to no source ofauthority
for its assertion that experimental use is an aflrmative defense."). See a/so Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell
tndustries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, I 3 52 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that, to invalidate a claim under 3 5 u. s.c. $ I 02(b),
the party must show that the invention was "the subject ofa commercial offer for sale not primadly for purposes of
experimentation").
128 Id.
t2e See, e.g., Madey,307 F .2d at 1361.
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Notably, ir Hamilton Beacfi, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the principle that "a
commercial offer for sale under $102(b) is 'one which the other party could make into a binding
contract by simple acceptance. "'130 ln Hamilton Beach, an offer made by a third party activated
the on-sale bar.rrr Although Hamilton Beach had initiated contact with its supplier, it had not
sent the message constituting the invalidating offer for sale.l32 As a consequenc e of lhe Hamilton
Beach holding, future inventors may be deterred from attempting to contact suppliers at any
point before they file patents for fear ofthose third parties taking actions that trigger the g 102(b)
"clock" prematurely. 133
Such results may discourage inventors from interacting with third parties while in the
experimental phase ofdeveloping an invention.l34 For smaller entities and individual inventors,
this will significantly impede the process oftesting potential products and, as a result, could
delay the ultimate disclosure ofinventions via patent applications.r3s Going forward, this result
will indeed have adversely affect the policy goal behind $102(b) ofaccelerating the public's
access to new inventions.136
Some attorneys have suggested that the consequences of improperly relying on a grace
period to preserve the right to subsequently pursue a patent can present significant problems for
tio Hamilton Beach,2Ol3 WL 4081872 at *6 (emphasis added) (quoting Grp. One, Ltd. V. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
254 F.3d 1041, 1048 (Fed. Cir.200l)).
rrr /d ("Hamilton Beach's supplier responded prior to the critical date that it was ready to fulfill the order. ln other
w-ords, the supplier made an ofer to sell the slow cookers to Hamilton Beach.,,) (emphasis in original).
t31 ld.
t.3-3. See generally Hamilton Beach,20l3 WL 4081872 at +10 (Reyna, dissenting).
tia See generally Hamilton Beqch Brands, lnc. v. Sunbeom Products, Inc.,Tltetislo & Thomas LLp Blog 11\ov. 12,
2013), http://cisloandthomas.com/hamilton-beach-brands-inc-v-sunbeam-products-inc/.
135 see generally Pennock v. Dialogue, 2j u.s. 1,2 (lt2g) (suggesting that, when inventors withhold their
inventions. the policy goals underly ing $ 102 are obsrructed).
' ".See RCA Corp. v. Data Cen. Corp., supra.
79
inventors ilnot addressed by an appropriately timed patent filing.l37 These risks illustrate the
danger of uncertainty in patent rights protection. To alleviate these risks, the Supreme Court in
Pfoff sought to clarify the definition of experimental use to provide inventors with a more
definite standard for determining when they need to file patents.l38 Another reason that the
Supreme Court decided to implement the two-prong test was to provide the inventor greater
control over the initial act that would trigger the statutory bar.r3e As a resdt, the Pfaff Covt
rejected the "totality ofthe circumstances" test, which presented a myriad of factors subj ect to
interpretation, in favor ofa more straightforward two-pronged test.lao
The Federal Circuit in Hamilton Beach ullimately applied the "no-supplier-exception"
rule it had previously articulated without analyzing whether the purpose of the offer was
experimental.ral The Hamilton Beach maioity may have felt that broad application of the "no-
supplier-exception" rule would advance Congress's goals by simplifying the inquiry into
whether an offer for sale had occurred. However, this approach will likely prompt future courts
to improperly concentrate entirely on whether any offer for sale occurred rather than considering
why such an offer was made.la2 Moreover, as noted above, this case illustrated that a supplier
can trigger the on-sale bar suddenly and without the inventor's express permission.la3 In the
13'See, e.g., Gene Qtinn. Hamihon Beach Brands v. Sunbeam Products: CAFC Sctys Manufacturer Supplying
lnnoyator Creates a pre-AtA t 02(b) Sqle. Available at http://www.ipwatchdog.coml2013l0S/l5lhamilton-beach-
sunbeam-cafc/id=44672l. Accessed I I 12/20 14.
t38 pfqf,525 U.S. at 65 ("Petitioner correctly argues that these provisions identifo an interest in proYiding inventors
with a definite standard for determining when a patent application must be filed.").
t.e td. at 6'l (,, An inyentor can both understand and control the timing ofthe first commercial marketing ofhis
invention.").
t4o Id. at 66-67 Oejecting the "totality ofthe circumstances" test for, among other reasons, being "vague").
tat Hamilton Beach, 2013 WL 4081872 at *6.
t42 Pfaff 525 U.S. 55 at 67. See Orbis corp. v. Rehrig Pacific co., Case No. l2-CV- l073JPS, 20]t3 8L240114 at
-+ 6."o. wir. Sept. 10, 2013) (..A much cioser question, however, is whether any ofthose occurrences constituted a
commercial olfer for sale.") (emphasis in original).
ta3 See Hamilton Beach, supra note 80 at*6.
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future, inventors may face decreased certainty regarding the validity oltheir patents when they
undergo prototyping efforts involving extemal entities during the developmental process.laa
The proceeding section outlines the practical effects of the Hamilton Beach decision,
particularly with regard to future infringement suits.
C. Adverse Practical Implications
In the Hamilton Beach dissent, Judge Reyna expressed his concem regarding the ef'fect of
this case on the future applicability ofthe experimental use negation.ra5 Judge Reyna noted that
"small enterprises and individual inventors who lack in-house prototyping and fabricating
capabilities" may face tremendous difficulties in defending their patents as the typical product
development cycle, since such entities almost invariably require third-party suppliers to create
prototypes and samples for experimental use.la6
Both large firms and small firms threatened by the possibility that their patents could be
held invalid as a result of a manufacturer's offer for sale might take actions that ultimately weigh
against the stated policy goals underlying the bar.1a7 One such action would be to keep the
invention as a trade secret rather than applying for a patent, thereby depriving the public of
knowledge that could in tum spark further innovation.la8 Alternatively, an inventor may file a
patent application before the product is lully perfected to avoid any potential questions of
tao See, e.g.,lrah H. Donner, Federal Circuit: No "supplier Exception" to On-Sale Bar. Strock Special Bulletin 1,6-
7 (2013) ("The majority opinion lof Hamilton Beachl creates significant uncenainty going forward regarding
whether prototyping agreements will trigger the one-year period under the on-sale bar.") (alteration to original).
ra5 Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc., 2013 WL 4081872 at * l0 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2013)(Reyna, dissenting) ("Under the majority's holding in this case, a single offer to buy for purely experimental
purposes may trigger the on-sale bar, and the experimental-use exception will offer them no salvation.").
ra6 /d (Reyna, dissenting)
r47 The U.S. Departrnent ofCommerce has classified "small" businesses as businesses employing less than five
hundred employees. 157 Cong. Rec. H4427 (201l).
ra8 See Isabelle R. McAndrews, The On-Sale Bar A./ier Pfaffv. Wells Electronics: Toward a Brighr-Line Rule,gl !.
Pat. & Tmdemark off. Soc'y 155, 164 (1999) (stating that some inventors "will choose to maintain their inventions
as trade secrets given the uncertainty as to whether patents issuing on the inventions will withstand attack").
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invalidity.l4e However, premature filings merely waste the resources of both inventors and the
patent office while contributing relatively liule public benefit.r50
As of 2008. the U.S. Small Business Administration estimated that "smal[" firms
represented roughly forty percent olcompanies with fifteen or more patents in the United
States.rsr Significantly, the authors ofthat report suggested that small firms represented roughly
twenty-four percent of U.S. patents in emerging technological fields.rs2 Combined, these
findings illustrate the significant impact of small entities in the United States technology-based
economy and, moreover, the importance of smaller companies for developing products in the
most advanced fields of modem technology.
Recently, the number of infringement suits brought by firms that own patents but do not
practice the inventions covered by those patents has increased significantly.ls3 Such firms, also
known as patent assertion entities ("PAEs" or "patent trolls"), have stifled innovation and
economic growth.r5a Although PAEs extract settlements from large entities, PAEs typically
target smaller companies in the majority oftheir suits.r55 The United States President's Council
of Economic Advisors. the National Economic Council, and the Office of Science & Technology
Policy have recognized the substantial negative effects ofPAE practices on innovation in the
tae See UMC Electronics, S16 F .2d at 660 (Smith, J., dissenting) (criticizing a holding that an inYention was
sufficiently complete at the time ofsale as encouraging prematue filing ofpatent applications).
t5r United States Small Business Administr*ion- An Analysis ofSmall Business Patents by lndustry and Firm Size,
iy. By Anthony Breitzman and Diana Hicks. Available at http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research./rs335tot.pdf.
Accessed 9/2012013.
152 ld. at 23 ("Small firms account for 24.5 percent of the 868 patents in this select set of the top t00 emerging
clusters. ln other words, small firms have more than three times as many patents in the emerging clusters as they
would be expected to have . . . .").
r53 The presidenfs Council of Economic Advisers, the National Economic Council, and the Office of Science &
Technology Policy, Patenr Asserlion and ll.S. Innovqtion I , 2 (June 20 l3) (stating that some of these firms,
co.monl|'kno*n as patent assertion entities (PAEs) or "patent trolls," concentrate their business model around
aggressively pursuing infringement claims).
r55 Id at 10.
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United States.156 These organizations have noted that changes in law resulting in uncertainty
about patent infringement play a significant role in infringement claims by PAEs.rsi These
groups have also stated that providing clearer patent rules would heavily mitigate PAE claims.rs8
The result in Hamihon Beach,by contrast, has increased ambiguity surrounding offers for
sale.rse Rather than discouraging PAEs, the Hamilton Beach holding has provided more
opportunities to invalidate existing patents.
As the USPTO has indicated, the percentage of utility patents issued to small entities
decreased by a substantial margin between 1995 and 201 1. r60 This trend may actually understate
the decline in the share ofpatents held by smaller companies, since the USPTO considers non-
profit entities such as universities to be small entities.l6l As mentioned above, smaller entities
contribute substantially to developing fields of technology.162 Thus, this decline may represent a
hindrance to ongoing developments in emerging fields.
The Hamilton Beach holding has already prompted courts to find that an offer for sale
pursuant to $102(b) had been made when a supplier submitted a proposal to manufacture an
invention for the inventor. For example, in Orbis Corp. v. Rehrig Pacific Co., the cou( applied
Hamilton Beach to conclude that a commercial offer for sale had occurred based on a supplier's
offer to produce several units ofthe invention.l63 The Orbis Corp. court had correctly considered
the need to address both prongs of the Pfafftest.t6a However, like the analysis in Hamilton
\56 Id. at 12.
151 ld. at 13.
t58 Id.
r5e Donner, sapra n ote 144, at 6-7.
160 See Scott Shane, Patents to Small Entities in Decline, Small Business Trends (July 19,2010),
http://smallbiztrends.com/20 | 0/07lhow-smart-is-the-average-entrepreneur.htm l.
t6\ Id.
1.6_2 See An Analysis ofSmall Business Patents by Industry ond Firm Size, supra note l5I.
t63 Orbis Corp..2Ol3 BL 240714 ata7.
t@ Id. at *4.
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Beach, that court's analysis did not explicitly contemplate whether the order was experimental in
nature. 165
In addition to arguing that the decision in Hamilton Beach was incorrectly decided, this
note outlines a potential course of action that Congress could take to correct the holding. In
particular, this note proposes a five-factor test for determining whether activity is experimental
for purposes of $ 1 02(b).
PART III: ANALYSIS
Some lawyers have suggested that the issues raised by this ruling can be avoided entirely
by simply filing for patent upon sending any production order.l66 However, companies filing
patents earlier in the development process may face additional challenges. Filing a non-
provisional patent application typically costs between $10,000 and $20,000.r67 Small firms are
less likely than their larger counterparts to be able to afford these expenses for every potential
patent.l6s Moreover, larger companies are capable of delegating fabrication and experimentation
tasks without initiating the on-sale bar, even if such delegation requires reallocation of funds.l6e
A small inventor who delegates the same fabrication task to a third party will face invalidation
due to that delegation unless he or she files for a patent swiftly thereafter.l70 This situation
inequitably favors larger corporations.
t6s Id. at *7 (citing Hamilton Beach Brand, Inc. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc.,20l3 WL 4081872 at n.2 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
14,2013)).
166 See, e.g., Marcus Sprow, File Early and File Often: Protecting Patent Rights in World of Global Outsourcing,
Wards Auto (Dec. 6,2013), http://wardsauto.com/industry-voices/file-early-and-file-often-protecting-patent-rights-
world-global-outsourcing.
167 Kirk Teska, Patent Swvyfor Managers: Spot and Protect Valuable Innovations in Your Company,207 (2007).
168 See Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Low,45 Hous. L. Rev. 1201, 1236
(2008) (citing Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms
Handicapped?, 47 l.L.& Econ. 45, 57 (2004)).
r6e See ln re Caveney, 761F.2d671,676 (1985).
r70 See Lindholm, infra note 174, at239.
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The issues presented by Hamilton Beach couldbe addressed by Congress. Even if
Congress does not address pre-AIA law, it could still submit a "Technical Corrections" bill
including provisions aimed at clarifying the on-sale statutory bar in the context of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act.lTl The issue with this solution, however, would be in deciding how
to appropriately address the issue. Congress could simply note that the no-supplier exception is
not solely dispositive in contrast to the hotding of Hamilton Beach.t72 However, courts may still
have difficulty determining apptying the Pfalftesl in ambiguous situations.
Altematively, Congress could alter the Pfafftest such that courts apply the test to the time
at which the product is delivered rather than when the offer is made.l73 This solution would
prevent third parties from unilaterally initiating the on-sale bar, but would not clarify whether the
sale itself was experimental on the date of delivery. A better solution would both address the
need for the experimental use doctrine as well as further define the term "experimental" in the
context ofthe on-sale bar. To implement such a solution, Congress should clarify that, although
there is no exception for offers for sale made by suppliers, every offer is subject to the
experimental use doctrine analysis regardless of whether the patent owner explicitly raises
experimental use in court.l74
Next, Congress should clarify the definition of "commercial" in the context of$102(b).
When establishing the first prong of the Pfaff test regading "commercial" offers for sale, the
r7r Congress previously approved a similar bill that focused on other provisions ofthe AIA in January 2013. &e
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS-LEAHY SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT, pL 12-214, tanuary 14,2013,
126 Stat 2456 .
t72 Hdmilton Beqch,726 F.3d at 1375.
r73 see Stephen Bruce Lindholm, Revisiting Pfaf qnd the on-Sale Bar,l5 Alb. L.J. sci. & Tech.2l3,2l6 (2004)("Perhaps inventors and the public would be better served by amending the statute ofthe on-sale bar to adiress only
the most e8regious abuses ofthe patent monopoly, where an inventor files for a patent after the invention has been
built and delivered.").
r74 The Federal Circuit expressly noted situations where simple orders to suppliers could constitute directpreparation for commercial exploitation, such as where a company proceedi io',stockpile,, its invention in
anticipation ofparent filing, in support ofthe "no-supplier exception" rule. special Deyices,2.70 p.:a at i:so.
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Supreme Court may have, in part, decided to utilize contractual principles in the context of
patent cases to allow courts to draw upon the wealth ofcase law associated with the field of
contracts law.lTs However, the contracts analogy does not provide sufficient explanation of all
concepts in existing patent law. Particularly, the concept of experimental use is a unique feature
of patent law that is not addressed in the Uniform Commercial Code or in the Restatement of
Contracts.
ln Pfaff, the Supreme Court suggested that a determination ofwhether activity is
experimental is not accompanied by significant uncertainty.lT6 However, courts have applied a
variety of factors in determining whether activity is experimental in nature.lTT As an example, the
court in Hamilton Beach applied a new factor, order size, to establish that the experimental use
doctrine would not have redeemed Hamilton Beach Brands' patent.lT8 This same kind of
inconsistency in application originally led the Supreme Court to reject the "totality of the
circumstances" test with respect to the on-sale bar.rTe Similarly, application ofthese factors has
been sufficiently inconsistent to warra-nt a more firm definition of the term "experimental."
A suitable definition of "experimental" would need to provide a more rigid standard that
retains enough flexibility to accommodate the variety of situations that may accompany
invalidating activity. Thus, a factor-based test would likely be the most appropriate solution. To
minimize difficulty balancing the factors, the new test should attempt to reduce the number of
factors to a more manageable number than those mentioned in EZ Dockv. Schafer Systems.tE0
rTt Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir' 2001).
t16 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67 (,,The experimental use doctrine, for example, has not generated concerns about
indefiniteness....").
111 See EZ Dock.276 F.3d at 1357.
178 See Hqmilton Beqch,2013 wL 4081872 at n.2.
r7e See Pfafl, 525 U.S. at 68-69.
r80 The court in EZ Dock explicitly mentions thirteen factors that have preyiously been considered in determining
whether activity is experimental in nal]ure. See EZ Dock,2'76 F .3d al 1357 '
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This note's proposed five-flactor test would include the following factors for determining
whether an activity is experimental in nature: (1) whether analyzing suitability of the invention
reasonably requires evaluation under actual conditions ofuse; (2) the degree ofcontrol over the
invention retained by the inventor during and after the activity; (3) whether there was a secrecy
obligation; (4) whether records of the experiment were kept; and (5) the amount ofprofit or
degree of competitive advantage derived by the inventor unrelated to inventive improvements.l8l
Notably, factors such as "whether payment was made" are excluded from this proposed test.l82 In
particular, that factor was not chosen because consideration ofwhether someone effectively
bought either the product itselfor testing results may inadvertently connote that a sale cannot
qualify for the experimental use negation.rs3
The final proposed factor is designed to maintain two arguably conflicting goals. First,
the phrase "profit . . . derived by the inventor" is used rather than "commercial exploitation" to
clarify the difference between gross income and profit.r8a This distinction specifically permits
inventors to sell their inventions during experimentation to cover costs ofdevelopment. Second,
the phrase "degree of competitive advantage derived by the inventor unrelated to inventive
improvements" addresses the potential issue of inventors stockpiling physical embodiments of
the invention by expressly contemplating whether the inventor has gained some substantial
commercial benefit that will not ultimately provide a better invention to the public.r8s
r8r The first four factors were included, either as presented here or as separate factors included here as an
amalgamation, in EZ Doclc See EZ Dock,276 F.3d at 1357.
r82 ln other words, the other factors from EZ Dock were excluded for inapplicability or to maintain feasibility ofthe
analysis. See EZ Dock,276 F.3d at 1357.
r83 This connotation starkly contrasts with existing case law. see, e.g., smith & Griggs,l23 u.s. at 256.re'Thedegree of commercial exploitation during testing" is one oithe factors meiloned in EZ Dock. See EZ Dock,
276 F.3d at 1357.
r85 As the court in Special Devices noted, there is a concem that inventors could unjustly exploit the patent system if
allowed to amass a large number of products before the $ I02(b) ,,clock,, begins running. see sp*-[ i*xnr. zzoF.3d at 1357.
CONCLUSION
The holding in Hamilton Beachhas laid a foundation for invalidating patents based on
activities that may well have been reasonably necessar:y to perfect inventions.l86 ln contrast to
prior case law, this case does not involve analysis ofthe experimental use doctrine.l8i Ideally, the
solution for inventors concemed about having their patents invalidated as a result of interactions
with suppliers would be simple: inventors, particularly those incapable ofproducing prototypes
in-house, should file provisional patents before beginning negotiations to have products
developed by third parties.l88 However, that solution presents significant practical issues, as
those inventors lose precious time from the exclusive use period guaranteed by their patents
while their inventions are still undergoing development, and the public benefit that arises from
filing of inadequate patent applications is severely diminished.l8e
The outcome in Hamilton Beach may inadvertently conflict with the Supreme Court's
stated interest in providing inventors with a definite time to file a patent by introducing
uncertainties regarding the commercial nature of prototyping and other experimental efforts.le0
Consequently, this case presents an excellent opportunity to resolve disparities in application of
the experimental use doctrine. The Federal Circuit should address the commerciality portion of
the first prong of the Pfafftest. Congress should define the term "commercial" within the context
of $ 102(b) in a manner that specifically notes that the experimental use doctrine is not an
affirmative defense. Additionalty, Congress should articulate this note's proposed five factor
standard for determining whether activity is experimental in nature.
ts6 See generally Orbis Corp.,2013 BL 240'714 at*7 '
w H.r;iltun Beach.2Ol3 WL 4}gl872 at n.3 (Reyna, dissenting)'
r88 See Sprow, szpra note 166.
'8e IJMj Electronics, 816 F.2d at 660 (Smith, J., dissenting)tx See Pfffi 525 U.S. at 68-69.
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